How Reasoned Should a CCF Decision Be? Confidentiality, Transparency and a Possible Direction for Reform

• The 2026 review of the CCF Statute

In 2026, INTERPOL is continuing its review of the Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), the instrument governing the Commission’s powers and the procedure for requests concerning access to, correction and deletion of data processed in the INTERPOL Information System. The latest stage of this work addresses an issue of direct practical importance to virtually every applicant before the CCF: how fully must the Commission explain the reasons for its decisions, and where should the line be drawn between the duty to give reasons and the need to protect confidential information?

• The fourth consultation on Article 38

On 20 July 2026, INTERPOL announced a fourth round of consultations with civil society, legal practitioners, academics and international organizations as part of the review of the CCF Statute. The current consultation concerns Article 38 of the Statute, “Nature and content of decisions”. Contributions received in this process are to be considered by INTERPOL’s Committee on the Processing of Data (CPD) at its meeting in September 2026.

• What Article 38 already requires

At first sight, Article 38 already sets a relatively high standard. A decision of the CCF’s Requests Chamber must be written and reasoned. The Statute expressly provides that a decision should contain, among other matters, a description of the procedure, the positions of the parties, a statement of the facts, the application of INTERPOL’s rules, an analysis of the legal arguments and the operative part of the decision.

• The Article 35 confidentiality regime

That requirement, however, operates alongside the confidentiality regime established by Article 35 of the Statute. Disclosure may be restricted where this is necessary to protect public or national security, prevent crime, preserve the confidentiality of an investigation or prosecution, protect the rights of the applicant or third parties, or ensure the proper discharge of the functions of the Commission or INTERPOL. Article 35 also requires restrictions to be justified and consideration to be given to whether at least part of the information, for example a summary, can be disclosed.

• The practical difficulty

This is where the difficulty arises. The CCF may have before it material that has not been disclosed to the applicant. As a result, an applicant may formally receive a reasoned decision without necessarily being able to see all of the factual material and considerations that influenced the Commission’s conclusion. In Red Notice and diffusion cases this is far from a theoretical concern. The source of the data may provide information from criminal proceedings, law-enforcement material or other documents while requesting that their disclosure be restricted. The applicant may then be required to challenge the compliance of the data with INTERPOL’s rules without knowing the full substance of the information taken into account by the Commission.

• INTERPOL’s framing: the source of the data

Interestingly, INTERPOL’s consultation paper frames the problem primarily from the perspective of the source of the data, usually a member country or another entity that supplied the information to INTERPOL. Some member countries have pointed out that confidentiality restrictions may prevent them from seeing the full reasoning of decisions directly affecting the data they supplied. INTERPOL identifies a practical consequence: an incomplete understanding of the reasons for a decision may make it difficult to assess whether there are grounds to seek revision under Article 42 of the Statute.

• The same problem for the applicant

The same problem, however, objectively exists on the other side of the procedure. If an applicant receives a decision from which substantial information has been withheld on confidentiality grounds, the applicant may have difficulty understanding why the request was refused, assessing the information relied upon against him or her, and determining the appropriate further strategy. The issue raised by INTERPOL therefore goes beyond the technical drafting of a single provision. It concerns how the grounds for restricting disclosure under Article 35(3) can be reconciled with the obligation under Article 38 to provide the parties with a genuinely reasoned decision.

• Finality of Requests Chamber decisions

This is particularly important because decisions of the Requests Chamber are final and binding on INTERPOL and on the applicant. The Statute does not provide an ordinary appeal against a CCF decision. Revision is possible, but Article 42 establishes a specific and relatively narrow basis for it: the discovery of a fact which could have led the Commission to a different conclusion had it been known at the time of the original proceedings.

• Why the quality of reasoning matters

The quality of the reasoning therefore matters not only for understanding a decision that has already been taken. It also enables the parties to identify which facts and legal arguments the CCF actually examined, which circumstances it regarded as decisive, and what led it to conclude that the processing of the data was or was not compliant with INTERPOL’s rules. If a significant part of that reasoning remains hidden, it becomes more difficult for an applicant to determine whether a particular argument was considered and rejected or was not addressed at all, what weight was given to particular evidence, which information supplied by the source of the data proved decisive, and whether subsequent developments might be capable of changing the Commission’s conclusion.

• Confidentiality is not complete openness

It would nevertheless be a mistake to reduce the issue to a demand that all material be disclosed to an applicant without exception. The CCF deals with information from criminal investigations, data concerning third parties, law-enforcement intelligence and material whose disclosure may genuinely prejudice an investigation or endanger individuals. Confidentiality is an essential part of international police cooperation. The real question is therefore not a choice between complete secrecy and complete openness. It is whether protected information can remain confidential while the party is still given enough of the substance of the reasoning to understand the logic of the decision and effectively protect his or her rights.

• Evidence versus reasoning

In my view, the key is to distinguish two matters that can too easily become conflated: the confidentiality of the evidence itself and the confidentiality of the reasoning based on that evidence. A legitimate reason for withholding a document, the identity of a source or particular sensitive details does not necessarily mean that the substance of the allegation cannot be communicated or that the decision cannot explain the significance attributed to that information.

• A three-tier model

In practical terms, this could be implemented through a three-tier model. The first tier would preserve a presumption of disclosure: information for which no specific ground under Article 35(3) exists should be available to the parties. The second tier would cover material that cannot be disclosed in full but whose substance can be communicated in summarized form. An applicant might not know the source or sensitive details, but should at least understand the substance of the allegation to which a response is required. The third tier would concern information that genuinely cannot be disclosed even by way of summary. In such cases, the CCF’s decision should, so far as possible without compromising confidentiality, identify the category of withheld material, the basis for the restriction and the significance of that material to the ultimate conclusion.

• An “impact test” for adverse findings

A further safeguard would be particularly important: a decisive adverse finding against an applicant should not ordinarily rest predominantly on information whose substance has not been disclosed to the applicant at all. Otherwise, an obvious procedural imbalance arises: a person loses the case because of an allegation to which he or she had no meaningful opportunity to respond. Where fully confidential material nevertheless has to be taken into account, the decision could expressly indicate whether that material was material to the outcome and whether the CCF would have reached the same conclusion without it. Such an “impact test” would allow a party to understand whether the result followed from known facts and arguments or from material that could not be challenged.

• The same model should apply to the source

The same model should operate symmetrically in relation to the source of the data. If insufficient reasoning prevents a member country from understanding a decision and assessing whether there are grounds for revision, the same logic applies to an applicant. Confidentiality may justify withholding information, but it should not ordinarily justify withholding the substance of the reasoning based upon that information.

• No amendment has yet been adopted

No amendment to the Statute has yet been adopted. INTERPOL is collecting and considering contributions as part of the review process, and it would therefore be premature to suggest that the standard for reasoning in CCF decisions has already changed or that any particular model will be adopted.

• Why the Article 38 consultation matters

Nevertheless, the decision to address Article 38 as a distinct part of the review is significant. INTERPOL has placed on the table the tension between two fundamental requirements of the CCF procedure: protecting confidential police information and explaining to the parties why a decision directly affecting their interests has been made. For applicants seeking the deletion of a Red Notice, diffusion or other data from INTERPOL’s systems, the outcome of this discussion may be highly significant. A more transparent standard of reasoning would make it easier to understand negative decisions, assess the importance attached to evidence and legal arguments, and make an informed decision about further steps.

• The core question

Ultimately, the question can be stated quite simply: can a decision be regarded as fully reasoned if a party is unable to understand a substantial part of why it was made? In my view, the answer does not require abandoning confidentiality. It requires a clearer distinction between the legitimate protection of sensitive information and a situation in which the logic of the decision itself becomes confidential.

Sources

INTERPOL, Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, Articles 35, 38 and 42.

INTERPOL, Call for contributions from Civil Society to the Committee on the Processing of Data, 20 July 2026: Nature and content of decisions (Article 38 of the Statute).

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